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Protocol composition logic, PCL, is a formal approach for proving security properties of a class of network
protocols. PCL involves reasoning directly about properties achieved by protocols steps, in a setting that
does not require explicit reasoning about attacker actions. The method relies on protocol invariants to
combine properties of diﬀerent roles of a protocol. While some protocol invariants can be complex to identify
and prove, many useful PCL invariants are relatively straightforward consequences of the programs (roles)
executed by the agents involved in the protocol. We present a logic program based approach for automating
proofs of invariants that appears eﬀective for invariants that are required for several standardized, widely
deployed protocols. We use the well-known Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLS/SSL) to illustrate the
approach.
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1 Introduction
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) [10,11,3,5,4,7,15] is an evolving formal logical
framework for proving security properties of network protocols. The central ques-
tion addressed by PCL is whether it is possible to prove properties of substantial
security protocols compositionally, using reasoning steps that do not mention at-
tacker actions explicitly. In order to reason about protocols compositionally, the
proof of properties of one sequence of actions by one agent involves not only local
reasoning about the security goal of that component, but also environment condi-
tions that prevent destructive interference from other actions that may use the same
certiﬁcates or key materials. These environment conditions are generally stated as
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hand, and properties that may be required of any other protocol running in the
same environment. Various versions of PCL studied in past work have been proved
sound for protocol runs that use any number of principals and sessions, over both
symbolic models and (for a subset of the logic at present) over more traditional
cryptographic assumptions [8].
The PCL proof method uses extensions of ﬁrst-order logic with axioms and proof
rules for protocol actions, temporal reasoning, knowledge, and a specialized form of
invariance rule called the honesty rule. The honesty rule is essential for combining
facts about one role with inferred actions of other roles, in the presence of attackers.
Intuitively, if Alice receives a response from a message sent to Bob, the honesty rule
captures Alice’s ability to use properties of Bob’s role to reason about how Bob
generated his reply. Roughly, the honesty rule says that if a property φ is preserved
by all the roles of a protocol, then if Bob executes only roles of the protocol, φ is
preserved by Bob’s actions. A basic feature of PCL is that the invariants are proved
by reasoning only about the actions speciﬁed by the protocol, which are the only
actions carried out by honest parties to the protocol; the need to consider attacker
actions is obviated by the form of the logic. Because honest principals do not have
their private keys misused by an attacker (by deﬁnition), the honesty rule does not
involve reasoning about situations where private keys are compromised.
As we discuss in Sections 2.2 and Section 2.3, while invariants are easy to for-
mulate, checking whether they hold is a tedious process, making invariant checking
a perfect target for automation. This is also observed independently by [13]. In this
paper, we describe a method for automatically establishing some invariants, using a
logic programming formulation of protocol actions, the invariants themselves, and
suﬃcient conditions to establish the stated invariants. In eﬀect, for each protocol
and invariant, our method creates a logic program with restricted use of negation
that searches for protocol properties that could violate the invariant. This is done
in such a way that if the logic program fails to prove a certain goal, it follows that
the invariant is provable in PCL. Because we work with conditions that guarantee
a PCL proof, and PCL does not require explicit reasoning about actions by an
attacker, our logic programs do not need to consider any possible actions by the
attacker.
We are primarily interested in invariants that are written as logical implications,
since these arise frequently in case studies of practical protocols. However, this
form of invariant poses several challenges. One is eﬃciency and correct termination
– our initial approach produced small logic programs that search for violations
of suﬃcient conditions, but take unreasonably long to execute. For soundness,
we need to ensure that for all possible ways of satisfying the antecedent of an
implication, the consequent holds. This leads us to use logic programming with
negation as failure, which further exacerbates eﬃciency issues. The key reasons
why we still achieve eﬃciency are as follows. We use SLD-resolution [17] as the
basis of our decision procedure. In PCL, each program variable is deﬁned exactly
once. This creates mutual exclusion among the rules of our logic program; at
most any one such rule is applicable at any point in the goal search. Further, our
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encoding of the PCL proof system ensures that unsuccessful search paths terminate
quickly. Thus the reason why we get computational eﬃciency is closely related to
the structure of PCL programs and the PCL proof system required to establish
invariants. While eﬀective in useful cases, our method is not complete since it
uses suﬃcient conditions that are not necessary for the existence of a PCL proof.
Further, as explained above, reasoning about many important invariants does not
involve cryptographic properties and so our technique is applicable to both the
symbolic and computational models of cryptography.
While we do not attempt here to address the full range of criticisms and concep-
tual misunderstandings presented recently in [2], we do note that in the process of
providing a translation of portions of PCL into logic programming, this paper does
clarify some syntactic issues involving the PCL term algebra and implicit typing
restrictions that are discussed in [2].
2 Preliminaries
We ﬁrst describe Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) in brief to help make the paper
accessible to readers unfamiliar with PCL. We then discuss the well-known Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which we use as a running example throughout
the paper. Readers familiar with PCL and the analysis of TLS using PCL may skip
to Section 3.
2.1 Overview of PCL
The framework of Protocol Composition Logic(PCL) [10,3,5,7] comprises a proto-
col programming language for deﬁning the roles of a protocol, a proof system for
establishing properties of protocols, and soundness theorems relating proof rules
to semantics of the protocol programs and logic. Proofs in PCL are sound in the
standard symbolic model; in this model, all cryptographic primitives are assumed
to be perfect, for instance an attacker can only decrypt an encrypted message only
if it has the appropriate key.
A protocol is deﬁned by a set of roles, each specifying a sequence of actions
to be executed by an honest agent. In PCL, protocol roles are formally deﬁned
using a simple “protocol programming language” based on [10], which we illustrate
using the TLS Client and Server roles in the next section. The possible protocol
actions include nonce generation, signatures and encryption, communication steps,
and decryption and signature veriﬁcation via pattern matching. Programs can also
depend on input parameters (typically determined by context or the result of set-up
operations) and provide output parameters to subsequent operations. A thread is
an instance of a protocol role.
The state of execution of a protocol at a given time is the sequence events that
have occurred till that time. Events can be communication steps (send/receive) or
internal actions (encryption, signature, hashing and so on). Most protocol proofs use
formulas of the form θ[P ]Xφ, which means that starting from a state where formula
θ is true, after actions P are executed by the thread X, the formula φ is true in
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the resulting state. Formulas φ typically make assertions about temporal order
of actions (useful for stating authentication) and/or the data accessible to various
principals (useful for stating secrecy). As a notational convention, the principal
executing a thread (sequence of actions) X is written as Xˆ. In the next section, we
list a proof of authentication of TLS.
The proof system extends ﬁrst-order logic with axioms and proof rules for pro-
tocol actions, temporal reasoning, properties of cryptographic primitives, and a
specialized form of program invariance rule called the honesty rule, described in
Section 2.3. We list below the axioms we use in this paper. For the proof of
soundness of the axioms and the rules, we refer the reader to [6,11,7].
AA1 [a]X a
AA2 Start(X)[ ]X ¬a(X)
AA3 ¬Send(X, t)[b]X¬Send(X, t) if σSend(X, t) = σb for all substitutions σ
AA4 [a; · · · ; b]Xa〈b
AN1 New(X, x) ∧New(Y, x) ⊃ X = Y
AN2 [new x; ]X Has(Y, x) ⊃ (Y = X)
AN3 [new x; ]X Fresh(X, x)
AN4 Fresh(X, x) ⊃ Gen(X, x)
VER Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Verify(Y, SIG[Xˆ](x)) ⊃ ∃X. Sign(X, x)
P1 Persist(X, t)[a]XPersist(X, t) , for Persist ∈ {Has,FirstSend, a,Gen}.
P2 Fresh(X, t)[a]XFresh(X, t) , where t ⊆ a.
FS1 Fresh(X, t)[send t′; ]X Contains(t
′, t) ⊃ FirstSend(X, t, t′)
FS2 FirstSend(X, t, t′) ∧ a(Y, t′′) ∧X = Y ∧ Contains(t′, t) ∧ Contains(t′′, t)
⊃ Send(X, t′) < a(Y, t′′)
Axioms represents general truths applicable to every protocol. For instance, the
axiom VER encodes the well known property of signatures that if a thread veriﬁes
that a message x is signed by a principal Yˆ , it must be that Yˆ ’s signature key
was used to generate the signature. Further, if the agent Yˆ is honest (the meaning
of honesty is discussed further in Section 2.3), no one else has access to this key,
implying that there exists a thread of the agent Y that did indeed sign the term x.
2.2 TLS
In this section we discuss the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [9]. Broadly,
TLS involves two principals called the TLS client and the TLS server. TLS guaran-
tees mutual authentication and establishes a shared secret between the two princi-
pals. We focus on the proof of the authentication property and identify the program
invariant that it needs. We also established other security properties of TLS as part
of a larger study [12] on IEEE 802.11i.
We ﬁrst express the TLS protocol in our protocol programming language.
Though TLS has several modes of operation, we restrict our attention to the
mode where both the server and the client have certiﬁcates. The TLS : Client
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TLS : Client = (X, Yˆ , Vx)[
new nx; send Xˆ.Yˆ .nx.Vx;
receive Yˆ .Xˆ.ny.Vy;
new secret;
encky := pkenc secret, Yˆ ;
sigterm := Xˆ.Yˆ .nx.Vx · Yˆ .Xˆ.ny.Vy·
encky;
sigvx := sign sigterm, Xˆ;
hc2 := hash Xˆ.Yˆ .nx.Vx · Yˆ .Xˆ.ny.Vy·
encky · sigvx · “client”, secret;
send Xˆ.Yˆ .encky.sigvx.hc2;
receive Yˆ .Xˆ.hs′′;
hs′ := Xˆ.Yˆ .nx.Vx · Yˆ .Xˆ.ny.Vy · Xˆ.Yˆ .
encky · sigvx · “server”;
verifyhash hs′′, hs′, secret;
]X〈X, Yˆ , secret〉
TLS : Server = (Y, Vy)[
receive Xˆ.Yˆ .nx.Vx; new ny;
send Yˆ .Xˆ.ny.Vy;
receive Xˆ.Yˆ .encky.sig.hc2′′;
sigterm := Xˆ.Yˆ .nx.Vx · Yˆ .Xˆ.ny.Vy·
encky;
verify sig, sigterm, Xˆ;
secret := pkdec encky, Yˆ ;
hc2′ := Xˆ.Yˆ .nx.Vx · Yˆ .Xˆ.ny.Vy ·
encky · sig · “client”;
verifyhash hc2′′, hc2′, secret;
hs := hash Xˆ.Yˆ .nx.Vx · Yˆ .Xˆ.ny.Vy · Xˆ.Yˆ .
encky · sig · “server”, secret;
send Yˆ .Xˆ.hs;
]Y 〈Y, Xˆ, secret〉
Table 1
TLS: Client and Server Programs
and TLS : Server programs are described in Table 1. In the programs Xˆ and Yˆ
denote the identities of the principals and (I)[actions]X〈O〉 speciﬁes a thread X of
principal Xˆ , executing the actions inside brackets and none after that; I and O are
the input and output parameters of the thread.
2.2.1 Modeling TLS
We brieﬂy describe an execution of the TLS client role. The client starts by sending
a nonce nx and its conﬁguration information Vx to the server. It then receives a
nonce ny and the server’s conﬁguration information, Vy. It now generates a nonce,
secret, encrypts it under the server’s public key and sends this to the server; this
is the secret that is shared between the two principals. It also concatenates all the
messages it has seen so far, and sends its signature over this concatenation to the
server; this allows the server to verify that the clients view of the protocol execution
matches its own. Finally, the client receives from the server a keyed hash (keyed by
the term secret) of the concatenation of all the messages the server has seen; this
allows client to verify that its view of the protocol run matches the server’s view.
These steps use the verify and verifyhash actions to check signatures and keyed
hashes respectively.
We now discuss the authentication guarantee for the TLS server. There is a
symmetric guarantee for the TLS client; we focus on the server guarantee as an
example. The guarantee states that on completion of the server role, principal Yˆ
is sure that it is communicating with its intended client Xˆ, further, the principals
agree on each other’s identity, protocol completion status, the values of the proto-
col version, cryptographic suite, and the secret that the client sends to the server.
The authentication property φtls,auth is formulated in terms of matching conversa-
tions [1]. Informally, the property states that on execution of the server role, there
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exists a role of the intended client with a corresponding view of the interaction;
more precisely the patterns in the sends and receives of the two roles match and
the actions are ordered in the sequence implied by an intended protocol execution.
φtls,auth ::= Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Honest(Yˆ ) ⊃ ∃X.
(Send(X, tlsm1) < Receive(Y, tlsm1)) ∧ (Receive(Y, tlsm1) < Send(Y, tlsm2))
∧(Send(Y, tlsm2) < Receive(X, tlsm2)) ∧ (Receive(X, tlsm2) < Send(X, tlsm3))
∧(Send(X, tlsm3) < Receive(Y, tlsm3)) ∧ (Receive(Y, tlsm3) < Send(Y, tlsm4))
We use tlsm1, tlsm2, tlsm3, tlsm4 as abbreviations for various TLS messages:
tlsm1 := Xˆ.Yˆ .nx.Vx , tlsm2 := Yˆ .Xˆ.ny.Vy , tlsm3 := Xˆ.Yˆ .ENCY (secret).sigvx.hc2, tlsm4 :=
Yˆ .Xˆ.hs.
The terms sigvx, hc2, hs are deﬁned in Table 1. The formula a < b asserts that
action a occurred before action b. Note that the receive action corresponding to the
last message sent by the server is not part of the guarantee as the server receives no
acknowledgment for this message. We now use φtls,auth to state the authentication
guarantee for a server Yˆ , communicating with client Xˆ .
TLS Authentication Guarantee:
(i) On execution of the server role, session authentication is guaranteed if Γtls,1,
deﬁned below holds.
Formally, Γtls,1  [TLS:Server]Xφtls,auth.
(ii) The formula Γtls,1 (deﬁned below) is an invariant of TLS.
Γtls,1 : Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Sign(X, sigterm) ⊃
(Send(X, tlsm1) < Receive(X, tlsm2) < Send(X, tlsm3))∧
FirstSend(X, nx, tlsm1) ∧ FirstSend(X, secret, tlsm3).
The formula FirstSend(X,n,m) states that thread X generated nonce n and sent
it out ﬁrst time in the message m. The invariant requires that any honest principal
which sends out a signature of a certain form also performs actions consistent with
the TLS client role. We discuss the proof of the second part of the guarantee in
Section 2.4. We now describe how the invariant is used in the security proof (Part
(i) of the guarantee above).
2.2.2 Proof of the Authentication Guarantee
The ﬁrst part of the argument uses the authentication property of signatures along
with the protocol invariant Γtls,1 to argue that there must be a thread of client Xˆ , the
intended peer of server Yˆ , which must have performed certain actions corresponding
to the TLS client role. The proof is summarized by the following steps below. The
ﬁrst line of the proof uses the axioms AA1,P1,AA4 to conclude that the TLS
Server has performed a certain sequence of actions. The next three steps use the
invariant Γtls,1 and the server’s signature veriﬁcation action to conclude that a
thread X0 of server’s intended peer Xˆ must have performed certain actions.
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AA1,P1,AA4 [TLS : Server]Y (Receive(Y, tlsm1) < Send(Y, tlsm2)
< Receive(Y, tlsm3) < Send(Y, tlsm4)) (1)
AA1,P1 [TLS : Server]Y Verify(Y, SIGXˆ{sigterm}) (2)
(−1), VER [TLS : Server]Y Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Xˆ = Yˆ ⊃ ∃X.Sign(X, sigterm) (3)
(−1),Γtls,1 [TLS : Server]Y Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Xˆ = Yˆ ⊃
and Inst X to Xo (Send(Xo, Xˆ, Yˆ ,m1) < Receive(Xo, Yˆ , Xˆ,m2)
< Send(Xo, Xˆ, Yˆ ,m3)) ∧New(Xo, secret)
∧ FirstSend(Xo, nx, tlsm1)) ∧ FirstSend(X
o, secret, tlsm3)) (4)
The second part of the proof uses the ﬁrst part of the proof along with properties
of nonces to order the actions of the client thread Xo and the server thread Y ; we
also conclude that the client thread must have the secret as we are guaranteed that
it generated it. This proves the authentication guarantee.
AN3,FS1,P1 [TLS : Server]Y FirstSend(Y, ny, tlsm2)) (5)
(−1), (4),FS2 [TLS : Server]Y Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Xˆ = Yˆ ⊃ Send(Y, tlsm2) < Receive(X
o, tlsm2) (6)
(4), (1),FS2 [TLS : Server]Y Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Xˆ = Yˆ ⊃
(Send(Xo, tlsm1) < Receive(Y, tlsm1)) ∧ (Send(Xo, tlsm3) < Receive(Y, tlsm3)) (7)
(1), (4), (6), (7) [TLS : Server]Y Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Xˆ = Yˆ ⊃
∃X.(Send(X, tlsm1) < Receive(Y, tlsm1)) ∧ (Receive(Y, tlsm1) < Send(Y, tlsm2))
∧ (Send(Y, tlsm2) < Receive(X, tlsm2)) ∧ (Receive(X, tlsm2) < Send(X, tlsm3))
∧ (Send(X, tlsm3) < Receive(Y, tlsm3)) ∧ (Receive(Y, tlsm3) < Send(Y, tlsm4)) (8)
2.3 Honesty Rule and Establishing Invariants
The honesty rule is an invariance rule for proving properties about the actions of
principals that execute roles of a protocol, similar in spirit to the basic invariance
rule of LTL [14] and invariance rules in other logics of programs. The honesty
rule is used to combine facts about one role with inferred actions of other roles.
For example, suppose Alice receives a signed response from a message sent to Bob.
Alice may use facts about Bob’s role to infer that Bob must have performed certain
actions before sending his reply. This form of reasoning may be sound if Bob is
honest, since honest, by deﬁnition in our framework, means “follows one or more
roles of the protocol.” The term “honest” is not meant in any deep philosophical
sense – a principal could fail to be honest in some run either through dishonest
intent, or as a result of some compromise that reveals the principal’s key to an
attacker. The assumption that Bob is honest is essential because the intruder may
perform arbitrary actions with any key that has been compromised. An example
property that can be proved by this method as we shall soon see is the invariant
required by the proof from the previous section, Γtls,1.
Recall from the previous section that a protocolQ is a set of roles {ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρk},
each executed by zero or more honest principals in any run of Q. A sequence P of
actions is an initial segment of role ρ, written P ∈ IS(ρ), if P is a contiguous preﬁx
of ρ such that (P starts at the beginning of ρ) (i) P ends with the last action before
a receive, or (iii) P ends with the last action of the role. A principal is honest in a
run of a protocol if the actions performed by that principal or with that principals
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keys are precisely the interleaving of the actions of some number of initial segments
of speciﬁed roles of the protocol. We now formally state the honesty rule:
∀ρ ∈ Q.∀P ∈ IS(ρ). Start(X) [P ]X φ
Honest(Xˆ) ⊃ φ
HONQ
no free variable in φ
except X bound in
[P ]X
Informally, the honesty rule says that if a certain property is a post condition of
every sequence of actions that an honest agent may execute, then the property
holds for the honest principal. We are guaranteed that honest principals follow the
protocol. Further, we assume that programs are scheduled non-preemptively and
halt only when they need input, for instance at receive actions. This allows us, in
the antecedent of the rule, to quantify only over action sequences that are initial
segments of the protocol Q. A slightly diﬀerent form of the honesty rule (based
on induction over so called basic sequences) occurs in [6]; the form stated above is
strictly more powerful and easier to automate using the method explored here.
2.4 Proving Invariants by Hand
We now brieﬂy describe the process of proving that the formula Γtls,1 is an invariant
of TLS. In this case, Q is TLS and consists of two roles, the TLS:Client role and
the TLS:Server role. Further, the TLS:Client role has three initial segments (as it
has two receive actions); call these TLS : Client0, TLS : Client1, TLS : Client2
in increasing order of length. The TLS:Server role has two initial segments (as it
has two receive actions, but one of them begins the role); call these TLS : Server0,
TLS : Server1, in increasing order of length.
We must prove that Γtls,1 is a post condition of each of these initial segments.
Some of the arguments are trivial: The initial segments TLS : Client0, TLS :
Server0 and TLS : Server1 do not contain signature actions and in these cases, the
antecedent of the formula fails trivially and the invariant holds.
The non-trivial cases are the initial segments TLS : Client1, TLS : Client2 as
they contain signature actions of the appropriate form and the antecedent of the
formula Γtls,1 holds. We now prove the invariant, by hand, for the initial segment
TLS : Client1. The proof for TLS : Client2 is similar.
The proof has two parts. We ﬁrst argue that there is only one binding for which
the antecedent is true (signature is generated). We do this by establishing that the
antecedent does not hold for all other bindings.
AA2,AA3,P1 [TLS : Client1]XSign(X, x) ⊃ x = sigterm (9)
Next we argue that for the one binding that we cannot rule out, the consequent
is true. First we show that three actions happened in a certain sequence. We have
to be careful enough to show that this is true for precisely the same binding for
which the antecedent holds. From the TLS security standpoint, it is important that
client’s signature matches its view of the session.
AA4 [TLS : Client1]X (Send(X, tlsm1) < Receive(X, tlsm2) < Send(X, tlsm3)) (10)
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Next we show that the nonce nx and the shared secret secret are ﬁrst sent out in
the two messages generated by the TLS client. Again, we have to be careful enough
to show that this is true for precisely the same binding for which the antecedent
holds. From the TLS security standpoint, the client’s signature is an explicit com-
mitment on the part of the client that it generated fresh nonces and sent them out
for the ﬁrst time in certain TLS messages. The proof from the previous section
used this to relatively order the messages of the client with respect to the server’s
actions.
AN3,P2,FS1 [TLS : Client1]XFirstSend(X, nx, tlsm1) (11)
AN3,P2,FS1 [TLS : Client1]XFirstSend(X, secret, tlsm3) (12)
Throughout the process, we needed to carefully prove that the consequent is
true for precisely the binding of sigterm for which the antecedent is true. Though
invariants are easy to formulate, the process of checking that they hold is fairly
tedious and thus invariant checking is a perfect candidate for automation.
To ﬁnish this section we list a program for which the TLS invariant does not
hold and describe an attack on TLS security. Consider the following program, which
receives a term, signs it and sends it out.
SignatureOracle = (X, Yˆ )[receive Yˆ .Xˆ.x; m = sign x.Xˆ; send Xˆ.Yˆ .m; ]X
Suppose that a TLS client also executes the above program, then the attacker
can break the authentication property of TLS as follows. It starts a session with
a server S pretending to be a client C. It sends the ﬁrst message and receives the
second message. The one thing it cannot do is produce the client’s signature; at
this stage it makes the client C execute the signature oracle protocol by sending it
an appropriately constructed term to sign. It can now complete TLS protocol with
the server S, which believes that it has communicated with client C and shares a
secret with it.
From our proof’s standpoint, we would not be able to show that Γtls,1 is an
invariant of a principal that executes the above signature oracle program: The
antecedent is possibly true for some binding of x, while the consequent of the in-
variant is deﬁnitely not. Our approach in the next section ensures all such ﬂaws are
identiﬁed automatically.
3 Checking Invariants via Logic Programs
We now describe our logic program based approach to automatically check invari-
ants. We informally state the main result as follows.
Theorem 3.1 (Informal) We can construct a logic program consisting of a set
of rules that encode part of the PCL proof system, a set of facts that encode the
PCL program and a query that encodes a PCL invariant having a certain general
structure, such that the logic program failing on the query implies that the invariant
holds for the PCL program.
J.C. Mitchell et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 234 (2009) 93–113 101
We assert that the encoding of the PCL proof system is independent of the
program and the invariant, and the encoding of the invariant is independent of the
protocol under consideration.
3.1 Encoding PCL programs
We start by describing our encoding of PCL programs. Recall from Section 2.3 that
we must show that the invariants holds at the conclusion of every initial segment of
every protocol that an honest principal may execute; we describe invariant checking
process for one such initial segment, the general case is simply a conjunction of such
steps.
PCL programs are modeled as a set of facts involv-
ing the action predicate. The action predicate has the form
action(thread, actionnumber, output, actionname, input). For instance, the
ﬁrst initial segment of the TLS Client role (TLS : Client0 from Section 2.4) is
written as the following set of facts. The second fact action(′X ′, 1.1, t1, cat, [nx, vx])
asserts that thread X concatenates terms nx and vx to generate the term t1. The







This initial segment picks a nonce and sends out a message containing the chosen
nonce and the client’s selection of the cryptosuite, to the intended server Yˆ . The
translation of PCL programs into the logic program encoding is largely straight-
forward. A few issues that came up: First, we model send actions as having no
outputs, the action on the network is treated as a side-eﬀect. In general, the num-
ber of inputs to an action depends on the type of action. The main diﬀerence
between the PCL program listing and the logic program encoding is the explicit
modeling of the concatenation actions. An alternative encoding could have used
the list construct, but we found that this leads to computational ineﬃciencies in
practice.
3.2 Encoding the PCL proof system
Next we describe our encoding of the PCL proof system related to invariant check-
ing. Recall from Section 2.4 that invariant checking involves checking for the pres-
ence of certain actions that act on terms with certain structures. Thus, the frag-
ment PCL proof system that we are concerned with expresses the construction
of terms by the PCL program actions. Our logic program encoding deﬁnes the
structure of terms using two term equality predicates, may(symbol, pattern) and
must(symbol, pattern), which roughly state the the program symbol X may have
the structure pattern and must have the structure pattern, respectively.
may(M, M) :- action(Y,N,M,new,[]).
may(M,enc(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,pkenc,[P1,P2]), may(P1,R1), may(P2,R2).
may(M,pair(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,cat,[P1,P2]), may(P1,R1), may(P2,R2).
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may(M,pair(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,[P1, P2],uncat,M), may(P1,R1), may(P2,R2).
may(P1,enc(M1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,pkdec,[P1,P2]), may(M, M1), may(P2,R2).
may(P1,R2) :-action(Y,N,_,match,[P1,P2]), may(P2, R2).
may(M,sig(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,sign,[P1,P2]), may(P1,R1), may(P2,R2).
may(P1,sig(M1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,_,verify,[P1,M,P2]), may(M, M1), may(P2,R2).
may(M,hash(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,hash,[P1,P2]), may(P1,R1), may(P2,R2).
may(P1,hash(M1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,_,verifyhash,[P1,M,P2]), may(M, M1), may(P2,R2).
There is an identical set of rules with must substituted for may. The consequent
(left hand side) of each rule is a predicate representing a term equality. For instance
the second rule says that the output of a public key encryption has a term structure
that inductively depends on the inputs to the encryption. Each rule can also be
viewed as an axiom in PCL. For instance, the second rule is based on the PCL axiom
[m := pkenc p1, p2; ]X m = Epk[p2](p1), where Epk[p2](p1) denotes the encryption
of p1 with the public-key p2.
While the may and must have an identical set of rules associated with them, the
only dissimilarity arises in the handling of terms whose structures are not completely
determined; for instance when a term is received and not parsed further, we cannot
conclude anything about its structure. Soundness of invariant checking requires that
we handle this lack of information diﬀerently in the antecedent and the consequent
of the invariant. Roughly, soundness is always preserved when the antecedent is
deemed true more frequently and the consequent is deemed false more frequently.
As we shall see in the encoding of invariants, the encoding of the antecedent uses
only the may predicate while that of the consequent uses only the must predicate.
We now formally deﬁne unconstrained symbols, symbols that we do not know
the structure of.
Deﬁnition 3.2 A symbol m is said to be constructed by a certain action if it occurs
in the appropriate position as described below:
new m; m := pkenc p1, p2; m := hash p1, p2;
match m as p; p1 := pkdec m, p2; verifyhash m, p1, p2;
m := cat p1, p2; m := sign p1, p2;
p1, p2 := uncat m; verify m, p1, p2;
If symbol m corresponds to the term t, then we deﬁne action constructing t to
be the action constructing m; A symbol m is said to be unconstrained if it is not
constructed by any action and neither is it in the input list. Note that send and
receive actions do not construct terms.
We assume that each symbol in a PCL program is constructed by a unique ac-
tion: There is certainly no need to reconstruct terms redundantly or use the the
same symbol to represent diﬀerent terms (we can handle this by alpha renaming).
More formally, the predicate may(X, t) means that the symbol X in the PCL pro-
gram corresponds to a pattern t, with unconstrained symbols corresponding to any
pattern; and must(X, t) means that the symbol X in the PCL program corresponds
to a pattern t; with unconstrained symbols essentially not substituted for. We can
determine unconstrained symbols by inspecting the program alone. The soundness
of invariant checking depends on faithfully adding appropriate may and must facts
for all unconstrained symbols in the programs. For instance, if a term t is received
and is not parsed further, nothing is known about its structure. We then add
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may(t,X) and must(t, t) as facts in the logic program; this asserts that on the one
hand, term t is possibly equal to any structure; and on the other hand, we cannot
conﬁrm that it has a speciﬁc structure.
may(m, X). m is an unconstrained symbol
must(m, m). m is an unconstrained symbol
For the TLS client program, we regard ny and Vy as unconstrained symbols. This
amounts to conservatively assuming that the server nonce ny and conﬁguration
information Vy are not type checked at the client’s end. We would like to prove
invariants even in the absence of such type information.
3.3 Encoding Invariants
We conclude this section by describing how we model invariants. From our ex-
perience of looking at a number of protocols in current industrial usage (e.g.
IEEE802.11i, Kerberos V5, IKEv2 and so on), most invariants used to prove au-
thentication properties are of the form:
Γ : ∀a¯. (θ(a¯) ⊃ ∃b¯. φ(a¯, b¯)),
where θ and φ are conjunctions of PCL action predicates and term equality pred-
icates. The invariants state that if an honest participant did certain action(s) on
terms of a certain form, then it also did some other action(s) on terms of a related
form. As we will use a standard decision procedure which focuses on ﬁnding satis-
fying assignments to a query, the above, universally quantiﬁed form of the invariant
is not appropriate—If we ask the query by encoding θ(a¯) ⊃ ∃b¯. φ(a¯, b¯) in some
way, the program will return all instantiations of the free variables that satisfy the
non-universally quantiﬁed formula; however that will not imply that the universally
quantiﬁed formula holds because there could be some instantiation which makes
the antecedant true but not the consequent. Therefore, we ask the negated query:
¬Γ : ∃a¯. (θ(a¯) ∧ ∀b¯. ¬φ(a¯, b¯)),
If the invariant holds, the program should fail to come up with an instantiation in
this case. We encode invariants as a conjuction of action predicates or derivatives
of action predicates along with may or must predicates that deﬁne patterns of
symbols used in the actions; more precisely, each action predicate is paired with a
may or a must predicate which is conjunction where the ﬁrst parameter of the term
predicate is bound in the action predicate. As discussed in the previous section,
our deﬁnitions of may and must handle lack of information diﬀerently, may allows
matches to be liberal while must is conservative. We will ensure that θ uses only
may while φ only uses must, making invariants checking conservative and hence
sound.
In this paper we will take Γtls,1 as the running example. The query corresponding
to Γtls,1 can be stated as follows. This is the negated version of the PCL query Γtls,1
from the previous section. We declare the invariant holds if the query fails.
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? action(X, N, M, sign, [M1,J]), may(M, sig(pair(AX, pair(AY,
pair(Vnx, pair(Vvx, pair(AY, pair(AX, pair(Vny, pair(Vvy,
enc(Vsecret, AY)))))))), AX)),
\+ (
action(X, N1, _, send, M2), must(M2, pair(AX, pair(AY,
pair(Vnx, Vvx)))),
action(X, N2, M3, receive, _), must(M3, pair(AY,
pair(AX, pair(Vny, Vvy)))),
action(X, N3, _, send, M4), must(M4, pair(AX, pair(AY,
pair(enc(Vsecret, AY), pair(sig(pair(AX, pair(AY, pair(Vnx,
pair(Vvx, pair(AY, pair(AX, pair(Vny, pair(Vvy,
enc(Vsecret, AY))))))))), AX), hash(pair(AX, pair(AY,
pair(Vnx, pair(Vvx, pair(AY, pair(AX, pair(Vny, pair(Vvy,
pair(enc(Vsecret, AY), pair(sig(pair(AX, pair(AY, pair(Vnx,
pair(Vvx, pair(AY, pair(AX, pair(Vny, pair(Vvy, enc(Vsecret,
AY))))))))), AX), client)))))))))),Vsecret)))))),
N1 < N2, N2 < N3,
firstsend(X, Vnx, M2),
firstsend(X, Vsecret, M4),
action(X, N4, Vnx, new, _)
).
Note that this invariant has action ordering and the predicate ‘FirstSend’ in
addition to basic action predicates. The action ordering is taken care of by the
numbering of the actions in the encoding of the program and using the numbers
appropriately in the query (in the above query, the line that asks if N1 < N2 and
if N2 < N3.)
The predicate Firstsend holds for some nonce n and a term t if the nonce was
sent out for the ﬁrst time in the term t. This is modeled in logic program as follows
by the following additional rule, which essentially says that the predicate holds for
a speciﬁc term and a nonce if there was no term sent out earlier that contains the
nonce.
firstsend(X, Nu, M) :- action(X, _, Nu, new, []),
action(X, N1, _, send, M), contains(M, Nu),
\+ (action(X, N2, _, send, M1), contains(M1, Nu), N2<N1).
The description of FirstSend depends on whether a nonce is contained in a
particular term or not. Contains is deﬁned as follows:
tcontains(S, S) :- action(Y,N,S,new,[]).
tcontains(pair(T1, T2), S) :- tcontains(T1, S).
tcontains(pair(T1, T2), S) :- tcontains(T2, S).
tcontains(enc(T1, T2), S) :- tcontains(T1, S).
tcontains(sig(T1, T2), S) :- tcontains(T1, S).
tcontains(hash(T1, T2), S) :- tcontains(T1, S).
contains(M, S) :- must(M, T), tcontains(T, S).
The full encoding is given in Appendix A.
3.4 Proving Soundness of Invariant Checking
Theorem 3.3 Given the above encoding of the PCL protocol Q and the PCL proof
system (PCL) as a logic program, failure of the query that encodes the negation of
the Invariant Γ implies that Q PCL Γ.
We now discuss the proof of the main theorem. We show that invariant checking
is sound for a standard decision procedure on logic programs. Recall from Section 2.3
that the invariant must be deemed to be true for every initial segment of every
protocol that the honest principal executes; we describe the process for one such
initial segment and show that, if our decision procedure outputs failure on the query
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for our logic program, then the invariant holds for that initial segment.
In the following proofs, we prove that a decision procedure employing SLD-
resolution [17] in a left to right, depth ﬁrst manner is sound for checking invariants.
We also use the fact that SLD-resolution tries every rule in the logic program before
failing. Most Prolog interpreters implement SLD-resolution in a left-to-right, depth
ﬁrst manner [16] which means that we can use standard tools to realize the decision
procedure. In particular, we used SWI-Prolog as our prototype tool [18].
Recall from the previous section that we work with invariants that have a speciﬁc
structure; the antecedent is a conjunction of (action, may) predicate pairs, where the
ﬁrst parameter of the may predicate is bound in the corresponding action predicate.
Similarly, the consequent is a conjunction of (action, must) predicate pairs. The
proof of the above theorem follows from the completeness of checking sub queries
of the form (action, may) (Lemma 3.8) and the soundness of consequent checking
sub queries of the form (action, must)(Lemma 3.4). We emphasize here that the
soundness and completeness lemmas are stated with respect to the correspondence
between the logic program encoding and PCL. For now we ignore the FirstSend
and ordering predicates. We will return to comment on these near the end of this
section.
Lemma 3.4 If the decision procedure proves the query
action(Thread,Number,Output,Action, Input), must(X, τ) , where X oc-
curs in Input or Output, then there exists an action in the initial segment with
output ρ and a substitution σ, which does not substitute any unconstrained symbols
in the program, satisfying σ(τ) = σ(ρ).
Substituting for unconstrained program symbols by constants in the consequent
of an invariant is unsound in the as we cannot deﬁnitely assert that the program
constant has a speciﬁc structure. We now prove the lemma.
Proof. First note that we must use facts and not rules to match the action predi-
cate as there are no rules with this predicate at the head. Further, based on our lgic
program and as our decision procedure works left-to-right, once the action predicate
in the query has matched an action fact, the X in the second predicate of the query
is bound to a constant. Eﬀectively we are left with a query must(x, τ), for some
constant x. We prove the lemma by induction on the number of rules that the
decision procedure applies.
For the base case, suppose that the decision procedure does not apply any rules
(uses only facts). The decision procedure binds the action query to an action fact
with input/output that is either an unconstrained variable or a member of the
program input list; as these are the only symbols with an associated must fact.
Further, each such term t only has a fact must(t, t) associated with it and therefore
the query pattern τ must either be precisely t, in which case soundness is trivial, or a
variable V , in which case, V is existentially quantiﬁed in the query and there indeed
exists a program action that matches the query; in the ﬁrst case it is important that
we ensure that in encoding programs ground terms other than constant strings do
not match query constants. Finally, in either case, unconstrained symbols are not
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substituted for.
Induction Hypothesis (IH): Suppose we have soundness for all queries of the
form must(x, τ) which the decision procedure proves by the application of n ≥ 0
rules.
We now prove soundness for a query must(x, τ) that the decision procedure
proves by application of n + 1 rules. The ﬁrst rule that the decision procedure
applies must have one of the following two forms:
- must(M, M) :- action(Y,N,M,new,[]). In this case, we have the binding
σ(τ) = m, where action(y,n,m,new,[]) is a fact, and we can argue soundness as
in the base case.
- must(M,enc(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,pkenc,[P1,P2]), must(P1,R1),
must(P2,R2). As the musts on the RHS must have been proved using ≤ n rule
application. So, by IH, there must exist a substitution σ1, which does not substitute
unconstrained symbols in the program, such that there is a term ρ1 occurring
in the program satisfying σ1(P1) = σ1(ρ1). Similarly we have σ2(P2) = σ2(ρ2).
Because of matching of the pkenc action which takes P1 and P2 as inputs, there
must be a term ρ such that ρ = Epk[ρ1](ρ2) occurs in the program. Since both
the musts occur in the same conjunct, σ1, σ2 must be consistent wrt common
variables, and hence we can construct the composite substitution σ = σ1 ∪ σ2. As
σ1(P1) = σ1(ρ1), σ2(P2) = σ2(ρ2) and ρ = Epk[ρ1](ρ2), we have σ(τ) = σ(ρ) and σ
does not substitute unconstrained variables.
- the proof is similar for all other actions. 
We now discuss completeness of antecedent checking. This is the more involved
part of the proof that uses properties of our logic program as well as assumptions
about the decision procedure. The next lemma shows that any query of the form
may(x, τ) has exactly one way to be resolved as in PCL every program symbol is
deﬁned exactly once.
Deﬁnition 3.5 A fact or a rule is said to be eﬀective for a goal of the form
may(x, τ), if it is either a fact of the form may(x, . . .) or a rule with the predicate
may at the head, whose ﬁrst subgoal is satisﬁed by an action fact which constructs
the term x.
Recall from section 3.2 that each symbol is constructed at most once. If it was
constructed by a program action, then there is exactly one action fact that has this
symbol as an output. Further there is exactly one rule corresponding to each action
type. Further, no may(. . .) fact is directly eﬀective for the goal. The argument
for the case when the symbol x is either unconstrained or part of the input list,
is similar; in this case, a unique fact may(x, τ ′) matches the query and no action
constructs the symbol x. So we have the following fact.
Fact 3.6 For any goal of the form may(x, τ), there is at most one fact or a rule
that is eﬀective.
We now use the above fact to show completeness of queries of the type may(x, τ)
for some constant x.
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Lemma 3.7 Fix a query may(x, τ). If there exists a substitution σ, which may
substitute unconstrained symbols in the program to any term, such that term ρ cor-
responding to symbol x occurring in the program satisﬁes σ(τ) = σ(ρ), then the
query returns true. Further, there is no other substitution σ′ that matches the query
upto most general uniﬁcation.
Proof. Our proof is by induction on the number of steps in the PCL program
used to deﬁne x, steps(x). Formally, let I denote the set of inputs to the action
that constructs a symbol m. Deﬁne the value of the function steps(m) to be 1 +∑
i∈I steps(i), with the following additional deﬁnitions that complete the base case:
For unconstrained and input list symbol m, steps(m) = 0
For new m; steps(m) = 1;
Base case: Here x must correspond to an unconstrained symbol or a symbol in
the input list. By Fact 3.6, there is a unique eﬀective ground fact may(x, ·), which
the decision procedure will ﬁnd after rejecting all other rules. If x is unconstrained
then it makes the appropriate substitution σ(Y ) = τ , where the ground fact is
may(x, Y ). Otherwise, σ must correspond to the identity substitution. In either
case, the substitution is unique.
Induction Hypothesis (IH): If x was constructed in n ≥ 0 steps and there is a
substitution σ such that σ(τ) = σ(ρ), then query may(x, τ) returns true in ﬁnite
time and σ is the unique such substitution.
Induction: Suppose x was constructed in n + 1 steps and there exists a substi-
tution σ, which may substitute unconstrained symbols in the program to any term,
such that σ(τ) = σ(ρ). Since x was constructed by a unique action, we have exactly
one of the following cases:
• by action [new x; ]: There is only one eﬀective rule may(M, M) :-
action(Y,N,M,new,[]).. As we argued in the base case, the decision proce-
dure must reject all other choices and ﬁnd this rule in ﬁnite time. Also, clearly
the substitution σ is unique, with τ bound to the constructed nonce.
• by action [x := cat x1, x2; ] where x1, x2 correspond to terms ρ1, ρ2 respectively:
It is given that there is a substitution σ such that σ(τ) = σ(ρ) = σ(ρ1.ρ2). Now,
this could occur in one of two ways:
(i) τ is pair(τ1, τ2) where τi’s are themselves term patterns - in this case σ(x1) =
σ(τ1) and σ(x2) = σ(τ2).
At some point, the decision procedure considers the one eﬀective rule
may(M,pair(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,cat,[P1,P2]), may(P1,R1),
may(P2,R2) and matches the ﬁrst subgoal against the correct fact
action(y,n,x,cat,[x1,x2]). By IH, since x1, x2 were constructed in
≤ n steps and there exists substitution σ such that σ(x1) = σ(τ1) and
σ(x2) = σ(τ2), therefore the decision procedure is able to return true for
may(x1, τ1), may(x2, τ2).
(ii) τ is a single variable. This case is dealt with similarly as above, except that the
decision procedure uses x1, x2 directly instead of τ1, τ2.
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In both cases ﬁnite time is ensured as there is only one eﬀective may rule whose
sub-goals are satisﬁed in ﬁnite time. Further, the substitution σ is unique.
• other actions are reasoned similarly.

Lemma 3.8 The decision procedure returns all matches to the query
action(Thread,Number,Output, a, Input), may(X, τ), where X occurs in ei-
ther Output or Input.
Proof. the decision procedure adds a goal may(x, τ) for each fact
action(′X ′, n, o, a, i), of which there are a ﬁnite number, that matches the
ﬁrst predicate of the query. By Lemma 3.7, there is at most one match for such a
query and it is found in ﬁnite time. 
Proof. [Theorem 3.3] We prove the following statements, that together imply the
theorem:
• The decision procedure explores all query variable bindings that make the an-
tecedent true.
• For each such binding, if the consequent is proved by the decision procedure, then
the consequent holds with that binding at the conclusion of the initial segment.
We ﬁrst prove that all antecedent matches are explored. The proof is by induc-
tion on the number of action(...), may(...) conjuncts in the antecedent. The
base case, when there is exactly one conjunct follows from Lemma 3.8.
Induction Hypothesis (IH): Assume that for n ≥ 0 action(..., M, Action,
...), may(M, τ) conjuncts, the decision procedure explores all possible successful
bindings.
Induction: Suppose there are n + 1 such conjuncts. Consider the ﬁrst
action(..., M, Action, ...), may(M, τ) conjunct. The decision procedure is
going to match the action(..., M, Action, ...) against all Action actions in
the protocol program and return successfully if corresponding bindings are found
for τ . Each such binding for τ imposes a binding for common variables on τi’s on
the rest of the may(Mi, τi’) conjuncts. So rest of the conjuncts are explored with
τi’s with some variables instantiated, which in essence are patterns again. So by
induction hypothesis, the decision procedure will explore all possible bindings for
each of the succeeding conjuncts for each binding of the ﬁrst conjunct.
Now we prove the second part of the suﬃcient condition. If the antecedent
holds with a certain binding, the common variable bindings are transmitted to the
consequent as well. The variables that are not bound yet still remain part of the τi
patterns. We use a similar induction. The base case, if there is only one conjunct
follows from Lemma 3.4.
Induction Hypothesis (IH): Assume that for n ≥ 0 action(..., M, Action,
...), may(M, τ) conjuncts, if the decision procedure matches successfully then
they are indeed satisﬁed by the initial segment.
Induction: Suppose there are n + 1 such conjuncts. Consider the ﬁrst
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action(..., M, Action, ...), may(M, τ) conjunct. By Lemma 3.4, since this
is matched successfully, the initial segment must satisfy it. This binding for τ
imposes a binding for common variables on τi’s on the rest of the may(Mi, τi)
conjuncts. So rest of the conjuncts are explored with τi’s with some variables in-
stantiated. So by induction hypothesis, if the decision procedure matches rest of
the conjuncts, then they must be satisﬁed by the initial segment. 
The soundness of the implementation with firstsend in the consequent follows
if: if action(X, , Nu, new, []), action(X, N1, , send, M), contains(M,
Nu), \+ (action(X, N2, , send, M1), contains(M1, Nu), N2<N1). suc-
ceeds then the initial segment satisﬁes FirstSend(X,Nu,M) for the same binding.
Now this rule succeeds if there exists a binding for which if
action(X, , Nu, new, []), action(X, N1, , send, M), contains(M, Nu)
is matched by the decision procedure then the initial segment does not satisfy
(Send(X,M1)∧Contains(M1, Nu)∧N2 < N1). The proof now involves a soundness
proof for the ﬁrst part and a completeness proof for the second part. Details can
be completed using a similar proof approach to above.
Completeness
We ﬁnish the paper with a brief discussion about completeness of invari-
ant checking. We ﬁrst list a toy example that shows that our invariant check-
ing method is not complete. Consider the following program and the formula
Receive(X, “Alice”) ⊃ Send(X, “Alice”).
Gossip = (X, Yˆ )[receive Yˆ .Xˆ.x; send Xˆ.Yˆ .x; ]X
It is easy to see that the formula is an invariant of the above protocol as the
string “Alice” is sent whenever it is received by the program. However our invariant
checking method proves unhappy and declares the invariant false. The precise query
is:
unhappy :- action(X,N,_, receive,M1), may(M1, "Alice")
\+ (action(X,N,M2,send ,_), must(M2,"Alice"))
Our invariant checking method ﬁnds that the antecedent is true for the binding
x = “Alice”, but cannot prove the consequent for this binding: The must fact in
the Prolog encoding of the program is overly restrictive in this context.
We now brieﬂy discuss why this lack of completeness is not a severe issue in
practice. In practice the antecedent of the invariant encodes that the principal
signs, encrypts or constructs a keyed hash over a term that is very protocol speciﬁc.
For instance, our running example Γtls,1, has the pattern sigterm that is speciﬁc
to the TLS protocol as it is a concatenation of messages that have a TLS speciﬁc
structure. We expect that most well designed real world protocols that are not
TLS, would have a suﬃciently distinct strucure so as not to satisfy the antecedent
for any binding. On the other hand if the antecedent of Γtls,1 is satisﬁed for some
binding by an initial segment of a protocol other than TLS, the protocol’s actions
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are suﬃciently similar to TLS; this can often be leveraged to construct an attack
as in the example from Section 2.4.
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A Prolog Encoding of TLS and an Invariant
% Initial Segment Consisting of the First Two Basic Sequences of the TLS Client Program.
% BASIC SEQUENCE #1
% This basic sequence contains two actions, a new and a send.






% BASIC SEQUENCE #2
% This basic sequence contains 5 parts. First the client checks the server’s response to
% the client hello. Next, it creates a ’secret’ and encrypts it using the server’s
% public key. Then it constructs a signature over the first message and the encyption.
% Then it constructs keyed hash, with ’secret’ as key, over the first message, the
% encyption and the signature. Finally it sends out the encryption, the signature and
% the hash.





action(y,3.4, dummy, match, [t5, ’Y’]).
action(y,3.5, dummy, match, [t7, ’X’]).
% Creating a shared secret.
action(y,4,secret,new,[]).
action(y, 5, encky, pkenc, [secret,’Y’]).
% Constructing the signature.
action(y, 5.1, t9, cat, [vy,encky]).
action(y, 5.2, t10, cat, [ny,t9]).
action(y, 5.3, t11, cat, [’X’,t10]).
action(y, 5.4, t12, cat, [’Y’,t11]).
action(y, 5.5, t13, cat, [vx,t12]).
action(y, 5.6, t14, cat, [nx,t13]).
action(y, 5.7, t15, cat, [’Y’,t14]).
action(y, 5.8, sigterm, cat, [’X’,t15]).
action(y, 6, sigvx, sign, [sigterm, ’X’]).
% Constructing the keyed hash.
action(y, 6.1, t16, cat, [sigvx, client]).
action(y, 6.2, t17, cat, [encky,t16]).
action(y, 6.3, t18, cat, [vy,t17]).
action(y, 6.4, t19, cat, [ny,t18]).
action(y, 6.5, t20, cat, [’X’,t19]).
action(y, 6.6, t21, cat, [’Y’,t20]).
action(y, 6.7, t22, cat, [vx,t21]).
action(y, 6.8, t23, cat, [nx,t22]).
action(y, 6.9, t24, cat, [’Y’,t23]).
action(y, 6.91, t25, cat, [’X’,t24]).
action(y, 7, hc2, hash, [t25, secret]).
% The Client sends the third message.
action(y, 7.1, t26, cat, [sigvx, hc2]).
action(y, 7.2, t27, cat, [encky,t26]).
action(y, 7.3, t28, cat, [’Y’,t27]).
action(y, 7.5, t29, cat, [’X’,t28]).
action(y, 8, dummy, send, t29).









% Term equalities needed for unparsed variables that occur in the program.
may(vy, X).
may(ny, X).
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must(vy, vy).
must(ny, ny).
% Checking that the invariant is satisfied by the initial segment.
% Note that the invariant is negated: we are unhappy if the antecedent occurs and the
% consequent is not satisfied.
unhappy :- action(X, N, M, sign, [M1,J]), may(M, sig(pair(AX, pair(AY, pair(Vnx,
pair(Vvx, pair(AY, pair(AX, pair(Vny, pair(Vvy, enc(Vsecret,
AY))))))))), AX)),
\+ (
action(X, N1, _, send, M2), must(M2, pair(AX, pair(AY, pair(Vnx, Vvx)))),
action(X, N2, M3, receive, _), must(M3, pair(AY, pair(AX, pair(Vny, Vvy)))),
action(X, N3, _, send, M4), must(M4, pair(AX, pair(AY, pair(enc(Vsecret, AY),
pair(sig(pair(AX, pair(AY, pair(Vnx, pair(Vvx, pair(AY, pair(AX,
pair(Vny, pair(Vvy, enc(Vsecret, AY))))))))), AX), hash(pair(AX,
pair(AY, pair(Vnx, pair(Vvx, pair(AY, pair(AX, pair(Vny, pair(Vvy,
pair(enc(Vsecret, AY), pair(sig(pair(AX, pair(AY, pair(Vnx, pair(Vvx,
pair(AY, pair(AX, pair(Vny, pair(Vvy, enc(Vsecret, AY))))))))), AX),
client)))))))))),Vsecret)))))),
N1 < N2, N2 < N3,
firstsend(X, Vnx, M2),
firstsend(X, Vsecret, M4),
action(X, N4, Vnx, new, _)
).
% The proof system for proving invariants.
may(M, M) :- action(Y,N,M,new,[]).
may(M,enc(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,pkenc,[P1,P2]), may(P1,R1), may(P2,R2).
may(M,pair(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,cat,[P1,P2]), may(P1,R1), may(P2,R2).
may(M,pair(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,[P1, P2],uncat,M), may(P1,R1), may(P2,R2).
may(P1,enc(M1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,pkdec,[P1,P2]), may(M, M1), may(P2,R2).
may(P1,R2) :-action(Y,N,_,match,[P1,P2]), may(P2, R2).
may(M,sig(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,sign,[P1,P2]), may(P1,R1), may(P2,R2).
may(P1,sig(M1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,_,verify,[P1,M,P2]), may(M, M1), may(P2,R2).
may(M,hash(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,hash,[P1,P2]), may(P1,R1), may(P2,R2).
may(P1,hash(M1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,_,verifyhash,[P1,M,P2]), may(M, M1), may(P2,R2).
must(M, M) :- action(Y,N,M,new,[]).
must(M,enc(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,pkenc,[P1,P2]), must(P1,R1), must(P2,R2).
must(M,pair(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,cat,[P1,P2]), must(P1,R1), must(P2,R2).
must(M,pair(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,[P1, P2],uncat,M), must(P1,R1), must(P2,R2).
must(P1,enc(M1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,pkdec,[P1,P2]), must(M, M1), must(P2,R2).
must(P1,R2) :-action(Y,N,_,match,[P1,P2]), must(P2, R2).
must(M,sig(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,sign,[P1,P2]), must(P1,R1), must(P2,R2).
must(P1,sig(M1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,_,verify,[P1,M,P2]), must(M, M1), must(P2,R2).
must(M,hash(R1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,M,hash,[P1,P2]), must(P1,R1), must(P2,R2).
must(P1,hash(M1,R2)) :- action(Y,N,_,verifyhash,[P1,M,P2]), must(M, M1), must(P2,R2).
tcontains(S, S) :- action(Y,N,S,new,[]).
tcontains(pair(T1, T2), S) :- tcontains(T1, S).
tcontains(pair(T1, T2), S) :- tcontains(T2, S).
tcontains(enc(T1, T2), S) :- tcontains(T1, S).
tcontains(sig(T1, T2), S) :- tcontains(T1, S).
tcontains(hash(T1, T2), S) :- tcontains(T1, S).
contains(M, S) :- must(M, T), tcontains(T, S).
firstsend(X, Nu, M) :- action(X, _, Nu, new, []), action(X, N1, _, send, M),
contains(M, Nu), \+ (action(X, N2, _, send, M1),
contains(M1, Nu), N2<N1).
% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- %
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